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Abstract
Several recent studies find evidence of electoral deficit cycles in a wide cross-section
of countries. However, this empirical finding seems to reflect electoral cycles in a subset
of countries that recently democratized. Thus, political budget cycles are a phenomenon
of new democracies, and they decrease over time. This statement raises the following
question: do fiscal distortions appear in different forms? This paper overcomes traditional
political budget cycles models, focusing solely on the dynamics of aggregate government
expenditure and deficits, in order to shed light on electoral composition changes in public
spending. Using data on 42 developing countries from 1975 to 2001, we find evidence of
electoral impacts on the allocation of public expenditure. Our results show that election-
year public spending shifts towards more visible current expenditure, in particular wages
and subsidies, and away from capital expenditure. Futhermore, our findings suggest that
electoral impacts on the allocation of public spending are likely to endure, even though
countries gain experience in electoral politics.
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1 Introduction
In the course of the three last decades, many developing countries have conducted democratic
political reforms. While democracy appears as an essentially multidimensional process, one of
its most important feature is unambiguously the setting of free and regular elections. Between
1990 and 2000, the number of countries governed by officials elected in competitive elections
rose from 60 to 100 (Beck and alii, 2001).
Democratic political institutions would provide those political incentive structures able to
induce better policy choices. Elections prompt accountability in two ways. They provide
political competition, and help governance to be more efficient by alleviating the moral hazard
issue (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986) or mitigating the adverse selection phenomenon (Rogoff,
1990). By weeding out incompetent politicians and giving those in power an incentive to put in
effort, elections are believed to provide suitable incentives for an efficient governance. However,
governments have an additional motive. Indeed, they face now a new constraint: they have to
renew their legitimacy in the periodical recurrence of elections. Therefore, electoral pressure
may lead politicians to manipulate public policy in order to increase their chances of re-election.
Political business cycles theory provides a usefull analytical context.1 Based on political
markets imperfections, and most notably on information asymmetries, such a theory highlights
the distortions induced by the recurrence of elections. Empirical studies in the 1970s until
the early 1990s focused almost exclusively on industrialized countries, and generally do not
find regular, statistically significant political budget cycles (see Alesina and alii, 1997; Drazen,
2001, for excellent reviews). In contrast, more recent studies (Remmer, 1993; Schuknecht, 1996;
Shi and Svensson, 2002; Brender and Drazen, 2005a) have not only confirmed the existence of
polically-driven budget cycles in developing countries, but have also shown the large magnitude
of these cycles. Before elections, public spending increases, while revenues fall, thus leading to a
large budget deficit in election years. In addition, in developing countries, much of the election-
1The political business cycles theory, initiated by Nordhaus (1975), studies the effects of elections on the
real economy, such as GDP growth rate and unemployment. Most recent studies have changed their focus by
shifting away from the real effects of elections, towards policy makers’ instruments. Such a move is partly
didacted by the lack of empirical evidence (Drazen, 2001), but also by the lack of direct governement control
over real economic variables (Shi and Svensson, 2003). In this paper, we will focus on political budget cycles.
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oriented policy making affects the expenditure side, because increases in public spending have
a very direct and immediate impact on voters’ welfare. Indeed, as the tax base is small in such
countries, tax cuts would not significantly enhance the government support (Schuknecht, 2000;
Chambas and alii, 2005).
However, political budget cycles theory seems highly inconsistent with the literature on
fiscal preferences of voters. This line of works examines how fiscal policy affects the re-election
probabilities of incumbents, and concludes that a government, which damages the financial
position of the country, harms its chances of re-election. Thus, voters are fiscal conservatives,
punishing high spending or deficits through polls. Indeed, following Peltzman’s work on the
United States (1992), recent studies have found evidence that voters punish rather than reward
election-year deficit spending in Latin America (Kraemer, 1997), Israel (Brender, 2003) and
Colombia (Drazen and Eslava, 2005). The strongest evidence suggesting that deficits do not
help re-election prospects comes from Brender and Drazen (2005b) in a sample of 74 countries
over the period 1960-2003. Indeed, they find no evidence that election-year deficits help re-
election in any group of countries, including developed and less developed, and countries with
different government or electoral systems. Brender and Drazen (2005a) reconcile those two con-
tradictory views by showing that political budget cycles are a phenomenon of new democracies,
in which voters lack the necessary information to assess economic policy, as well as the ability
to properly process this information. They futher argue that political budget cycles decrease
over time, as countries gain experience in competitive electoral processes.
The aim of this paper is to suggest a different approach of that also reconciles these appar-
ently contradictory views. Indeed, very few studies have detailed fiscal policy instruments by
which governments may try to influence their popularity around elections. Analyses that focus
solely on the dynamics of the overall budget are at risk of misinterpreting the evidence, besides
missing an important part of the action. In fact, politicians may change the composition of
expenditure in an election year, without increasing the overall budget deficit. In the same vein,
another contribution of this paper is to analyse the different effects of elections on the various
components of overall public spending.
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Such a test is particularly relevant in the context of developing countries. Weak institu-
tional structures in these countries allow for greater political discretion over policy instruments.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect political budget cycles to be more apparent in develop-
ing countries. Futhermore, the implications may be particularly important for these countries
insofar as politically-motivated policies may be at odds with economic reforms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing theories,
along with previous empirical studies. Section 3 presents the econometric analysis. Section 4
concludes and suggests some directions for future research in this area.
2 Electoral Manipulation Via Expenditure Allocation:
Theoretical Arguments
Two strands of literature aim at explaining distortions around elections. This study applies
the opportunistic approach initially developed by Nordhaus (1975),2 according to which policy-
makers maximise their probability of re-election. Indeed, the partisan approach (Hibbs, 1977;
Alesina, 1987)3 is unelikely to be fruitful in studying electoral policy cycles in developing coun-
tries, where the differences in economic and ideological preferences among parties are much
harder to pin down, and where the pattern frequently does not exhibit the typical Western
left-right distinction.
While political business cycles theory has motivated numerous empirical tests, very few
studies have directly tested political budget theory against changes in the composition of public
spending, despite the theories’ specificity in that regard. We propose a review of the relevant
strands of the political budget cycles theory, in order to pinpoint which components of public
spending are favoured by governments to enhance their prospects of re-election.
2Following Down’s works (1957), Nordhaus developed some political business cycles models. The government
is here conceived as a single actor, which aimes at maximizing its chances to keep or reach the power.
3According to this approach, politicians pursue some ideological goals. The uncertainty surrounding the
policies conducted after the elections, depending on which party has gained the power, may engender some
systematic economic fluctuations.
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2.1 Manipulation of Current Expenditure
Rogoff (1990) designed a signaling model in which a political budget cycles arises due to
information asymmetries4 about the incumbent’s competence in administering the production
of public goods.
All agents’ expected utility is determined by the comsumption of private and public goods.
However, since the position of chief administrator is considered to be a great honor, leaders
receive an additional “ego rents.” These rents can take the form of non-monetary benefits due to
the great honor of being chief executive and, more generally, misuse of public office for private
gains.
The production of public goods requires taxes, as well as administrative competence. A
competent government is able to provide a given level of public goods at a lower level of
taxes, than an incompetent one. Competence is persistent, although it may change over time.5
Indeed, skills might realistically be thought to vary through time, since leadership abilities may
have appeared as well-suited to deal with one set of historical circumstances, but may become
outmoded as the problems faced by the country change. Also, even if the same leader stays in
power, they may be turnover among his key advisors.
This model is marked by two key features. First is the information asymmetry regarding the
incumbent’s level of competence. Citizens are initially uninformed about the type of incumbent,
whereas the incumbent knows his own type. In other words, the incumbent has a temporary
information advantage over voters, in the sense that he sees his competence shock contempora-
neously. While usual in such models, this information structure is particularly plausible in the
context of developing countries, where poor accounting practices, as well as underdeveloped
media, prevent voters from evaluating a government’s performance. In this way, Shi and Svens-
4In the most traditional models, voters are naive, not simply in the way they form their expectations, but also
in the way they assess government performance. Recent models (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988; Persson and Tabellini,
1990) attempt to reconcile rational expectations on the part of voters with opportunistic policy manipulation
by incumbent politicians. The driving assumption behind these rational opportunistic models is the existence
of temporary information asymmetries.
5Competency follows a first-order moving average, so that competency persists, but only for one period.
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son (2002a) argue that the strength of the cycles depend on the availability of information.6
As voters become more informed, the magnitude of the cycles decreases. Second, a critical fea-
ture of the production function is that public investment decided in time t, an election period,
only becomes visible and productive at time t+1. Voters observe taxes and current expen-
diture contemporaneously, and use this information to form inferences concerning investment
spending and the incumbent’s competence shock.7 Such a production structure, combined with
the informational asymmetry regarding competence, gives rise to a separating equilibrium,8 in
which the competent incumbent has an incentive to bias pre-election fiscal policy toward easily
observed current expenditure, and away from capital expenditure.
This model throws light on the role of “visibility” in influencing government resource al-
location around elections. According to Rogoff, “visibility” of public expenditure would be
associated in particular with current, rather than capital, expenditure. His argument is not
that current expenditure is intrinsically more visible, but rather that it is more immediately
visible and hence of more direct political value in the pre-election period. In contrast, capital
investments are often long-term projects and their completion may be difficult to coordinate
with elections. Moreover, the high potential for having incomplete projects at election time
could create political risks for incumbents, who may be seen as unable to deliver promised
benefits (Block, 2002).
Block’s findings (2002) are consistent with Rogoff’s equilibrium budget cycle model. Based
on a sample of 69 developing countries, he provides evidence that government spending shifts
toward more visible, current expenditure and away from public investment. However, elec-
tions were not competitive in many countries during the 1975-1990 period. Moreover, Block
limits his analysis to presidential systems, in order to address the potentially biaising effects
6These authors have created an index of the availability of information, which is the result of the number of
radios per capita and of a binary variable indicating whether the country allows freedom of broadcasting.
7Economy is continually subject to shocks from various origins, such as economic crisis, union claims, or
energy shocks.
8By excluding dominated strategies, it is possible to rule out all but one of the separating equilibria. By
further refining the equilibrium concept, using the criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), one can also rule out
pooling equilibria (Rogoff, 1990).
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of endogenously-timed elections. And such a strategy introduces an important selection bias.9
Finally, and most importantly, some theoretical and empirical analyses highlight another allo-
cation of public spending prior to elections. We consider this literature in section 2.2 below.
2.2 Targeted Investment Expenditure
Contrary to the specific literature on political budget cycles, a larger public choice literature
points to the political importance of organized interest groups with the power to lobby politi-
cians for policies favorable to them (Olson, 1965; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Bates, 1981;
Krueger, 1993). More recently, Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001) have linked the power of
special intesrests to the process of electoral competition through a model of campaign finance
and mobilization of votes. From this perspective, it seems us important to draw a link between
the literature on political budget cycles and the one on special interest politics.
Drazen and Eslava (2004, 2005) propose the first formal model that integrate special interest
groups into an intertemporal model of political cycle with rational voters.10 An incumbent can
target government spending to specific groups of voters, whose behaviour is seen as highly
influenced by targeted fiscal policy, and at the expense of other expenditure. This views differs
from other models of political budget cycles, insofar as voters care about the preferences of
incumbents over different interest groups, rather than about his true competence.
Politicians have unobserved preferences over groups or types of expenditure. Voters are
unaware both of their weight in the incumbent’s objective function, and of how swing they are,
meaning how sensitive to expenditure their group’s voting behaviour is. Voters will prefer a
candidate who assigns higher value to goods they like the most, but they only have imperfect
information about the politicians’ preferences over different voters groups. They therefore need
9Block considers that elections take place at regular time in presidential systems, which is not the case in
parliamentary ones. Such a methodology may be criticized in two ways. First, presidential regimes also know
some endogeneous elections, particularly in developing countries (Shi and Svensson, 2002b). Second, selected
countries systematically present some characteristics that distinguish themselves from parliamentary regimes
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003).
10Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) present formal models where, in order to
gain votes, candidates make promises of balanced-budget targeting of voter groups. However, they assume that
campaign promises are binding commitments to a post-electoral fiscal policy, so that there is no voter inference
problem.
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to extract such information about an incumbent’s preference, from her fiscal actions. Since
politicians’ preferences over types of expenditure is regarded as displaying some persistence
through time, high pre-election spending on one good is positively correlated with its provision
after the election.
The strength of the political cycle depends on the distribution of preferences, as well as
on the amount of information voters have about the political environment. In particular, the
larger fraction of swing voters, the more targeted spending increase prior to elections. Moreover,
the incumbent’s ability to be engaged in electoral manipulation is increased by its access to
privileged information about the political environment. In particular, his privileged information
about the relative impact of targeting one group or another, gives him the ability to raise votes
through spending, even though all voters are aware of the electoral incentives he faces. As a
result, before elections, the composition of expenditure is titled towards goods that are favored
by groups with greater electoral importance.
This model suggests the importance of distinguishing between targeted and non-targeted
types of expenditure. Such a classification is not readily available, nor straightforward. How-
ever, it has been widely argued in the literature that the category of spending that is particularly
“targetable” is that of capital spending for investment projects (Ferejohn, 1974; Bates, 1981;
Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, Keefer and Knack, 2002; Eslava, 2005).11 Opportunistic targeted
expenses, close to the so-called pork barrel spending, will most likely take the form of infras-
tructure projects, such as the construction of roads, schools, or water plants, since they are
easier to target to particular constituencies because of geographic and sector specificity. Futher-
more, infrastructure expenditure appears as a more convenient tool for political patronage of
specific groups, since new construction contracts may be given selectively.12 Finally, public
investment projects usually run over several years. Hence, we may consider an incumbent
wanting to influence voters by credibility promising them favored expenditure after an election.
Such an incumbent may find it useful to target voters with the programs they prefer, and to
11This classification may take different forms in various countries, depending on the population heterogeneity
and of the weight of the various sectors of the economy.
12Wade (1991) illustrates, for example, how contracts for irrigation projects in India may be selectively
provided in exchange for kickbacks and rents.
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begun those programs before election, but to complete them only after the election.
Many studies find evidence consistent with this model. Khemani (2004) studies state leg-
islative assembly elections in 14 major states of India, and shows that election years have a
great positive impact on investment spending, particularly on the construction of roads, to the
detriment of current expenditure. Based on Colombian municipalities data, Eslava (2005) also
indicates pre-electoral shifts of resources away from current spending, and toward the devel-
opment of infrastructure-related projects. Finally, Schuknecht (2000) concludes that capital
expenditure, expressed as a share of GDP, is the preferred instrument to influence election
outcomes in a group of 24 developing countries for the 1973-1992 period.13
2.3 Discussion
The predictions of the two types of models are highly sensitive to the assumptions about the
different categories of public spending. Rogoff’s model suggests that “visibility” of expenditure
would be associated with current, rather than capital, expenditure. Thus, policy manipulations
around elections times are undertaken to provide immediate economic benefits to large numbers
of voters. Public expenditure targeting model, on the other hand, argues that capital expendi-
ture is easy to target to specific constituencies and locations. From this perspective, cycles in
targeted spending reflect greater incentives for politicians around elections to provide targeted
benefits to small groups of pivotal voters, in exchange for campaign finance or mobilization of
political support. To summarize, we interpret evidence of capital spending cycles as indicative
of election-year targeting of special interests, while cycles in current spending are more likely
to provide immediate benefits to the mass of voters.
However, the literature has totally ignored that certain components of current expenditure
can also generate exclusive benefits that can be directed at specific constituencies. For instance,
subsidies could be targeted to specific producer groups. From this perspective, we propose to
probe deeper into the choice of policy instruments around elections and to focus on wages and
13However, many countries cannot be seen as democratic all over the said period. Moreover, Schuknecht uses
Nordhaus’ and Rogoff’s models without proposing an alternate theoretical analysis justifying its econometric
results.
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subsidies. As these types of expenditure combine the two arguments of the theoretical models,
we would expect that they are positively affected by elections.
Table 1 summarizes previous empirical studies and theoretical predictions. While it exists
indisputable evidence of political budget cycles involving aggregate data, neither theory, nor
empirical evidence provide a clear-cut answer to electoral effects on the allocation of public
spending. In the next section, we will attempt to answer this question by empirically examining
which components of public expenditure are privileged by governments in election time.
3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 The Data
Our sample includes annual data from 42 developing countries for the 1975-2001 period, thus
creating a panel of 1134 country-year observations.14 However, many countries may not be
considered as democratic during the entire sample period. According to Brender and Drazen
(2005a), and Block (2002, 2003), political budget cycles only make sense in countries in which
elections are contested. When elections are not competitive, and incumbents face a near zero
probability of loosing office, the ego rents are not at risk. Therefore, the incentive to distort is
greatly diminished. In contrast, Shi and Svensson (2002) argue that the desire of dictators to
eliminate signs of discontent, even before sham elections, may account for increases in spending
and deficits in non-democracies. We consider this point in section 3.4 below.
Data on public expenditure come from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS)
and Government Financial Statistics (GFS). We will focus on central, rather than general,
government spending for two reasons. First, central data are more reliable and comparable
across countries and time. Second, results with general spending would be difficult to interpret,
as they involve several levels of government, which should respond to different types of elections
and in different ways. The IMF classification of governement expenditure follows two main lines.
14The limited availability of data on the composition of public expenditure restricts the number of countries
included in our sample. The characteristics of the political systems of these countries and the dates of elections
are set in Table 2.
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The economic classification divides total spending into current and capital expenditure. The
former includes expenditure on goods and services, wages and salaries, subsidies and other
current transfers, as well as interest payments. The later covers payments for the purchase or
the production of new or existing durable goods. By contrast, the functional classification is
based on the purpose toward which the expenditure is directed.15 We will focus on transport and
communication expenditure, which is used as a proxy for spending in economic infrastructure
(Devarajan, Swaroop and Zoo, 1996).
Most important for our analysis, a dummy variable is introduced to reflect the impact of elec-
tions. Election dates and institutional data on the election process are taken from the Database
on Political Institutions, provided by the World Bank (Beck and alii, 2001), IDEA (Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Since 1945 to Date”) and IFES (Inter-
national Foundation for Electoral Systems, election guide). For countries with parliamentary
political systems, we include legislative elections, while for countries with presidential systems,
we consider executive elections.16
In much of the literature, the election dummy is equal to one in the year of the election,
no matter at what time of the year the election took place. If the election took place late in
the year, then the dummy indeed captures mostly the period before election. However, if the
election took place early in the year, then the dummy may capture primarily post-electoral
effects. To address this issue, we define the dummy as equal to one in the year before the
election, if the election took place in the first half of the year, and equal to one in the year of
the election otherwise. The data set includes 213 pre-electoral periods.
15The functional classification breaks total expenditure into categories such as healthcare, education, social
security and welfare, transport and communication, as well as defense, each of which includes both current and
capital expenditure.
16In parliamentary countries, elections of the legislature coincide with those of the executive. In presidential
countries, the executive is separately elected, but almost always the legislature is also elected in the same year.
In our sample, there are only 24 mid-term elections, that take place between years of simultaneous presidential
and legislative elections. Our results remain identical when the later are introduced. These findings are available
from author upon request.
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3.2 Specification
The basic specification takes the following form:
Yit = γYit−1 + αElectit + βX + ai + it (1)
where i = 1,...N and t = 1,...Ti.17 Yit stands for the share of the different components of expen-
diture in total governement spending, apart from debt interest payments. The main variable of
interest is Elect, which captures the influence of elections. In addition, the ai’s denote a full set
of country dummies,18 and it is an error term. Finally, X is a vector of controls. Among them,
we include the level of development, measured by the log of real per capita income. According to
Wagner’s Law, public expenditure tends to increase as a society becomes wealthier. Moreover,
claims for more public regulation and for social welfare system change the composition of pub-
lic expenditure. We also control for the degree of urbanization. Most public capital spending
concerns infrastructure, and rural areas need them more. Hence, we hypothesize that a larger
degree of urbanization will lead to less demand for infrastructure (Sturm, 2001).19 In addition,
we control for the openness, measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. More open
economies are often more vulnerable to foreign competition, and they compete for business by
offering adequate infrastructure. In a similar vein, in order to attract foreign direct investment,
a governement could increase public capital spending (Sturm, 2001).20 Effects of changes in
the terms of trade are also examinated. The output growth, resulting from improved terms
of trade, may reduce the need for social assistance from government, which, in turn, should
lower current expenditure. A decline in the terms of trade, on the other hand, could require
17We indicate the temporal dimension through Ti, since the panel is unbalanced. Insofar as the temporal
dimension of series is important, we test their stationarity by administrating the Maddala-Wu test. The nil
hypothesis of non-stationarity is always rejected in a significant manner, at the threshold of 1%.
18Years effects were generally insignificant and were dropped from the regressions. The qualitative results in
all regressions do not significantly change when we include them.
19Demographic variables, indicating the age structure of the population, were tested, but were found to have
no significant impact on the allocation of public spending.
20Rodrik (1998) argues that an increased trade openness correlates with greater expenditure on social pro-
tection. However, our study does not focus on this type of expenditure.
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higher current expenditure if social assistance needs to rise (Schuknecht, 2000). We also con-
trol for the influence of foreign aid, with an expected positive sign of the coefficient for capital
expenditure (Sturm, 2001).21 Finally, any analysis of fiscal policy in developing countries has
to take into account programs with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF usually
provides access to more international financing, and imposes conditionality stressing economic
stabilization, including fiscal consolidation. Programs supported by the IMF should, therefore,
harden the government’s budget constraint and result in lower public expenditure. More im-
portantly, these programs may affect the composition of public spending insofar as “cuts in
public investment are less visible and politically costly than cuts in other spending” during fiscal
adjustments (Alesina, Perotti and Tavares, 1998). We include an IMF dummy, which takes the
value of one when a program is in force, and equals zero otherwise.22
Fixed effects regressions control for omitted time-invariant country characteristics. How-
ever, all estimations include a lagged dependent variable, with an expected positive coefficient.
Government administrations are constrained by budgets, and current budget largely determines
the next period’s appropriations (Niskanen, 1971). Such an inertia provides some stability and
predetermines fiscal spending (Shuknecht, 2000). The use of fixed effects estimators in a regres-
sion with lagged dependent variable introduces a potential bias. Indeed, the lagged dependent
variable Yit−1 is correlated with the error term. Since the order of the bias is 1/T (Nickell,
1981; Kiviet, 1995), we expect a small bias.23 However, to address this issue, we also consider
the Generalised-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator developed for dynamic models of panel
data. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) estimation strategy is to first-difference the equations to
eliminate fixed effects and to fix the resulting inconsistency by applying instrumental variables
consisting of appropriately lagged levels of the variables. However, Arellano and Bover (1995),
as well as Blundell and Bond (1998), show that these estimations have poor precision in finite
samples. Indeed, when the explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged levels of these
21Foreign aid is critical in financing expenditure in developing countries. A finding that the allocation of
public spending changes during election years could thus not be claimed as evidence of political manipulation
if it were the result of election-year fluctuations in aid receipts. Controlling directly for foreign aid eliminates
this explanation.
22See Table 3 for detailed data sources and descriptive statistics.
23The lengh of our sample is 27 years, but some countries do not have data for the entire period.
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variables are only weakly correlated with differences of these variables in the differenced regres-
sion equation. In order to increase the precision of the estimates, they propose to combine the
differenced regression with the original regression in levels. The instruments for the regression
in differences are those described above, while the instruments for the regression in levels are
the lagged differences on the dependent variables. The system GMM estimator controls for un-
observed country-specific effects as well as potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
In the following, we report the results from fixed-effects and GMM estimations.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Preliminary Evidence
Results are displayed in Table 4. We consider the three spending variables defined in Section
3.1, namely current expenditure, capital expenditure and expenditure in infrastructure, ex-
pressed as a share of total public spending. It appears that the composition of public spending
changes before elections. More specifically, three regularities stand out. First, the estimated
coefficient of elections on current expenditure share is greater than one in FE and GMM estima-
tions, and it is statistically significant (columns 1 and 4). Thus, on average, current expenditure
share is expanded by more than one percentage point in election time. Second, capital expendi-
ture share is cut prior to elections (columns 2 and 5). Third, elections do not have a significant
nor a systematic effect on the share of infrastructure spending (columns 3 and 6).
These findings strongly confirm the predictions of Rogoff’s signaling model. Election-year
public expenditure shifts towards more visible, current expenditure, and away from capital
expenditure. Contrary to the predictions of public expenditure targeting models, there is no
electoral effect on infrastructure spending. However, these basic results need to be examinated
in more detail, insofar as some components of current spending, such as subsidies and wages,
could be particularly targeted.
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3.3.2 Interpretation of Results
Table 5 reports election year effects on wages and subsidies. As predicted, the pre-electoral
increase in current expenditure share seems to be largely caused by an increase in subsidies,
and civil servants and government employees’ salaries (columns 1, 2, 4 and 5). Since these com-
ponents of public spending are targetable and immediately visible, it is difficult to distinguish
between the two theoretical arguments. However, we argue that our findings are more sugges-
tive of broad-based policies that provide immediate economic benefits to the mass of voters.
Indeed, subsidies and wages are generally regarded as more populist categories of spending that
need to be substantially increased in order to affect large numbers of voters (Khemani, 2004).
Moreover, when we add all potentially targetable expenditure, namely capital expenditure,
subsidies and wages, we find no evidence for significant electoral cycles (columns 3 and 6).
3.4 Alternative Specifications
3.4.1 Potential Endogeneity of Election Timing
The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of the timing of elections on the composition
of public expenditure. Following much of the literature, we have initially considered that the
election variable is exogenous relative to the fiscal variables. However, the scheduling of elections
does not usually follow a strict, constitutionally-established pattern in developing countries.
This cast doubt on the identification assumption. More exactly, two potential issues arise.
First, the coefficients on the election cycle may be subject to omitted variable bias, if both
the timing of elections and the fiscal policies are affected by a common set of unobserved
variables, such as crises or social unrest, which are not included in our regression (Shi and
Svensson, 2002b). In such a case, our coefficient estimate will be biased. In particular, if
the omitted variables correlate positively with election timing and negatively with fiscal policy
outcomes, there will be a downward bias. For instance, if crises lead to a lower government
fiscal balance, as well as early elections, omitting this variable will induce a downward bias in
the coefficient estimate on the election variable.
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Second, the timing of elections may be strategically chosen by the incumbent politicians.
Indeed, Berument and Heckelman (1998) pointed out that opportunistic cycles may also occur
as a result of setting election date when economic conditions are particularly favorable. This
may pose a reverse causality problem if politicians condition the timing of elections on fiscal
policy outcomes. In this case, our coefficient estimate does not correspond to the notion of
political budget cycles.
Following Brender and Drazen (2005a), we separate out those elections whose timing is
predetermined.24 To this purpose, we look at the constitutionally-determined election interval
and we take as predetermined those elections which are held during the expected year of the
constitutionally-fixed term.25 Among the 213 election periods, 149 are classified to be pre-
determined. Table 6 reports the results. The contrast between the effect of scheduled and
potentially endogenous elections confirms that we need to distinguish between both, in order to
properly identify a causal effect of elections on the composition of public spending. As only the
coefficients on predetermined elections are statistically significant, our results effectively reflect
the effects of elections on the allocation of public spending.26
3.4.2 Competitive Elections
Initiated in developed countries, the political budget cycles theory assumes the existence
of some institutional structures that are typical of advanced economies, such as multi-party
electoral competition. Indeed, uncertainty as to the outcome of elections is critical in motivating
incumbents to engage in pre-electoral economic policy distortions in order to preserve their
rents. However, electoral competitiveness is not to be taken for granted in developing countries.
24This classification is based on www.electionworld.org data that indicate the frequency of elections country
by country.
25The perfect way to deal with this reverse causality issue is to find two instrumental variables, that are
correlated with the timing of elections, but not with the error term. However, to our knowledge, no study
has found such an instrument concerning a cross-country sample. Note that even though our strategy does
not eliminate the potential bias, it reduces it. Indeed, all unexpected early elections are coded as 0 in the
predetermined elections dummy.
26Rogoff’s model (1990) suggests that pre-election fiscal policy distortions are likely to be less severe for
opportunistic early elections than for end-of-term elections. The basic reason is that the call for early elections
may serve as an additional signal. Incompetent incumbents prefer to wait for end-of-term elections, in order to
enjoy a certain extra period of ego rents. As a result, competent incumbents do not need to distort fiscal policy
as much to separate themselves when calling for an early election.
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The DPI (Beck and alii, 2001) has two variables to capture the competitiveness of elections:
the Executive and Legislative Indices of Electoral Competitiveness (EIEC and LIEC).27 To test
the hypothesis that political budget cycles are more prevalent in multi-party electoral systems,
we reestimate our baseline regression after dropping non-competitive elections. The data set
includes 166 competitive elections. The results are displayed in Table 7. As predicted, the
electoral effects on the allocation of public spending are larger than those in Table 4.
3.4.3 Evolution of the Political Budget Cycles
Political budget cycles are dynamic processes by their very nature. Yet virtually none em-
pirical studies have examined temporal effects across elections. Brender and Drazen (2005a)
analyse the evolution of political deficit cycles, including separate dummy variables for each
of the first five competitive elections. Their results suggest that electoral fiscal effects become
less strong as there is more experience with elections. Indeed, once we concentrate on the later
elections, no statistically significant political deficit cycles are found.28 We follow the same
methodology in order to determine if a similar statement may be established concerning the
pre-electoral distortions in terms of public spending allocation.
The results are displayed in Table 8. Two main findings stand out. First, founding compet-
itive elections exhibit large public expenditure distortions. In transition elections, incumbent
politicians have a greater discretion in manipulating pre-electoral economic policies, and have
an incentive to deter the entry of future challengers. Indeed, incumbents may attempt to scare
off potential challengers and to solidify their bases of support before the opposition gains any
influence on the policy-making process (Block and alii, 2003). Second, electoral impacts on
the allocation of public spending do not disappear. These forms of pre-electoral distortions are
more subtle and are likely to endure.
27These indicators are scored from one, no elections, to seven, elections in which there are multiple candidates
running for office and no candidate obtains more than 75 percent of the vote. In the empirical work below,
EIEC and LIEC are dichotomized: they are set equal to one, if they equal 6 or 7 (where 6 indicates that
multiple candidates could and did run for office, but the winner received more than 75 percent of the vote), and
0 otherwise.
28Note that, for the countries included in our sample, we find similar results. These findings are available
from author upon request.
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4 Conclusion
This paper offers a comprehensive view of electoral cycles in developing countries, studying
the composition of government spending. We provide evidence of systematic distortions in
the allocation of public expenditure as a function of elections. Indeed, our empirical analysis
indicates that politicians shift the composition of pre-election spending towards current expen-
diture and away from capital expenditure. Thus, politicians prefer to use broad-based rather
than targeted spending at election times. Moreover, while political deficit cycles disappear as
there is more experience with elections, our dynamic analysis suggests that electoral impacts
on the allocation of public spending endure.
Taken as a whole, our findings reconcile two contradictory views of pre-electoral manip-
ulation, one that it is a useful instrument to gain voter support and a widespread empirical
phenomenon, the other that voters punish rather than reward spending deficit. As countries
gain experience in electoral politics, politicians prefer to change the allocation of expenditure
in election years, without increasing the overall budget deficit.
Two interesting issues remain open. First, an explanation of the difference between our
results and other studies (Khemani, 2004; Eslava, 2005) could arise from comparing national
political cycles to sub-national cycles. Further research on the contrast of election strategies in
national versus local elections would provide insights to the question of political accountability
at different levels of government. Second, the composition of political budget cycles may depend
on political, institutional and economic features of the country. More works along these lines
are likely to be fruitful.
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Table 1: Electoral Effects on the Composition of Public Spending:
Theoretical Predictions and Previous Empirical Studies.
Theoretical Predictions
Authors Models Variables Electoral Impacts
Rogoff (1990) Competence signaling Current expenditure (% total expenditure) Positive
Capital expenditure(% total expenditure) Negative
Drazen and Eslava (2005) Pork barrel cycles Current expenditure (% total expenditure) Negative
Capital expenditure(% total expenditure) Positive
Infrastructure expenditure(% total expenditure) Positive
Empirical Studies
Authors Sample Variables Tested General Findings
Block (2002) 69 developing countries Current expenditure (% total expenditure) Positive
1975-1990 Capital expenditure (% total expenditure) Negative
Schuknecht (2000) 24 developing countries Current expenditure (% GDP) Positive
(not significant)
1973-1992 Capital expenditure (% GDP) Positive
Khemani (2004) India Current expenditure (% total expenditure) Negative
1960-1992 Capital expenditure (% total expenditure) Positive
Public service delivery (road construction) Positive
Eslava (2005) Colombia Current expenditure (% total expenditure) Negative
1987-2000 Capital expenditure (% total expenditure) Positive
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics
No Country Birth of Democracy1 Forms of Government2 Electoral Rules Elections Dates3
1 Argentina 1983 Presidential Proportional 83, 89, 95, 99
2 Bolivia 1982 Presidential Proportional 78, 79, 85, 89, 93, 97
3 Bostwana 1966 Parliamentary Majoritarian 79, 84, 89, 94, 99
4 Brazil 1985 Presidential Proportional 85, 89, 94, 98
5 Burundi Presidential Proportional 84, 93
6 Cameroon Presidential Majoritarian 75, 80, 84, 88, 92, 98
7 Chile 1989 Presidential Majoritarian 89, 93, 2000
8 Colombia 1957 Presidential Proportional 78, 82, 86, 90, 94, 99
9 Costa Rica 1841 Presidential Proportional 78, 82, 86, 90, 94, 98
10 Dominican Republic 1978 Presidential Proportional 78, 82, 86, 90, 94, 99
11 Egypt Parliamentary Majoritarian 76, 81, 87, 90, 95, 2000
12 El Salvador 1984 Presidential Proportional 77, 84, 89, 94, 99
13 Ethiopia Parliamentary(96) Majoritarian 96
14 Fiji 1990 Parliamentary Proportional 77, 82, 92, 99
15 Guatemala 1986 Presidential Proportional 78, 82, 85, 90, 95, 99
16 India 1950 Parliamentary Majoritarian 77, 80, 84, 91, 96, 98
17 Indonesia Parliamentary Proportional 77, 82, 87, 92, 97, 99, 2000
18 Kenya Presidential Majoritarian 79, 83, 87, 92, 97
19 Korea 1988 Presidential Proportional 92, 97
20 Lesotho Parliamentary(94) Majoritarian 93, 98
21 Madagascar 1992 Presidential Proportional 77, 82, 89, 93, 96, 2001
22 Malaysia 1957 Parliamentary Majoritarian 78, 82, 86, 90, 95, 99
23 Marocco Presidential Majoritarian 77, 84, 93, 97
24 Mauritius 1968 Parliamentary Majoritarian 76, 82, 87, 91, 94, 2000
25 Mexico 1994 Presidential Proportional 76, 82, 88, 94, 2000
26 Nepal 1990 Parliamentary(81) Majoritarian 81, 86, 91, 95, 97, 99
27 Nicaragua 1990 Presidential Proportional 84, 90, 96, 2001
28 Pakistan 1988 Parliamentary(89) Majoritarian 77, 85, 88, 91, 94, 97
29 Panama 1989 Presidential(85) Proportional 84, 89, 94, 99
30 Papua New Guinea 1975 Parliamentary Majoritarian 77, 82, 87, 92, 97
31 Paraguay 1989 Presidential Proportional 78, 83, 88, 89, 93, 98
32 Peru 1980 Presidential Proportional 80, 85, 90, 95, 2000
33 Philippines 1987 Presidential Proportional 78, 81, 84, 87, 92, 95, 98
34 Sri Lanka 1948 Presidential Proportional 77, 82, 88, 94, 99
35 Thailand 1992 Parliamentary(79) Majoritarian 75, 79 83, 87, 92, 95, 96
36 Trinidad&Tobago 1962 Parliamentary Majoritarian 76, 81, 86, 91, 95, 2000
37 Tunisia Presidential Majoritarian 89, 94, 99
38 Turkey 1983 Parliamentary Proportional 77, 83, 87, 91, 95, 99
39 Uruguay 1985 Presidential Proportional 84, 89, 94, 99
40 Venezuela 1958 Presidential Proportional 78, 83, 88, 93, 98
41 Zambia 1991 Presidential Majoritarian 78, 83, 88, 91, 96
42 Zimbabwe 1989 Parliamentary Majoritarian 80, 85, 90, 96, 2000
1 The birth of democracy in a particular country corresponds to the first year of a string with uninterrupted positive POLITY
values. POLITY index assigns to each country and year an interger score ranking from -10 to +10, with higher values associated
with better democracies. This index is based on the competitiveness and openness in selecting the executive, on the political
participation, and on the constraints on the chief executive.
2 The classification of the forms of government, based on Beck and alii (2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2003), distinguishes
two prototypes, which have to main features. Presidential regimes have a directly elected president, fully in charge of the
executive, with the executive not being accountable to the legislature for its survival, and with a clear separation of powers. On
the other hand, in parliamentary regimes, the executive is not directly elected, but formed out of the majority of the legislature.
Thus, it needs the continued confidence of a majority in the Parliament to maintain its powers throughout the entire election
period. Futhermore, there is not a clear separation of powers. Years within brackets identify significant reforms, that have
changed the country’s classification.
3 In parliamentary systems, we consider legislative elections, while for presidential regimes, we include executive elections.
Highlighted dates correspond to competitive elections, as defined by Beck and alii (2001).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs.
Capital expenditure 20,6∗ 11,6 978
Elect = 1 20,0 11,9 192
Elect = 0 20,7 11,6 786
Current expenditure 79,4∗∗ 12,0 978
Elect = 1 80,1 12,3 192
Elect = 0 79,3 11,9 786
Expenditure in infractructure 7,5 4,7 823
Elect = 1 7,4 4,6 159
Elect = 0 7,5 4,7 664
Wages 26,9∗ 9,4 834
Elect = 1 27,1 9,6 160
Elect = 0 26,7 9,3 674
Subsidies 24,2∗ 14,2 884
Elect = 1 25,0 14,0 170
Elect = 0 24,1 14,2 714
Openness 60,6 31,9 1101
Urban population 45,2 22,3 1093
Aid 4,3 6,7 1120
GDP per capita 1997,2 1875,5 1120
Fund-supported program 0,4 0,5 1132
∗∗(∗) indicates that the difference is statistically significant at 5(10) percent level.
Sources of data:
Data on public expenditure come from the IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS). The
different components of expenditure are expressed in percentage of total public spending, apart
from debt interest payments.
Openness is measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (World Bank Indicators,
2003).
Urban Population is expressed in percentage of the total population (WDI, 2003).
Foreign aid is expressed in percentage of GDP (WDI, 2003).
GDP per capita is expressed in constant US dollars (WDI, 2003).
Data on Fund-supported programs come from various issues of the Annual Report published
by the IMF.
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Table 4: Electoral Effects on the Allocation of Public Expenditure
FE estimates GMM
Dependent Current Capital Infrastructure Current Capital Infrastructure
variables expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
Elections 1.127 -1.000 -0.110 1.210 -0.887 -0.197
(2.66)∗∗∗ (2.55)∗∗ (0.51) (2.42)∗∗ (1.94)∗ (0.65)
Yt−1 0.651 0.695 0.629 0.880 0.858 0.773
(25.78)∗∗∗ (29.02)∗∗∗ (20.57)∗∗∗ (7.03)∗∗∗ (8.35)∗∗∗ (6.49)∗∗∗
(log)GDP per capita -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(3.20)∗∗∗ (3.22)∗∗∗ (3.44)∗∗∗ (1.18) (1.18) (0.81)
Openness -0.043 0.038 -0.003 -0.026 0.026 0.019
(2.83)∗∗∗ (2.75)∗∗∗ (0.34) (0.82) (0.85) (1.24)
Urban population 0.250 -0.229 0.250 0.152 -0.170 -0.094
(5.03)∗∗∗ (4.96)∗∗∗ (5.03)∗∗∗ (1.05) (1.15) (1.24)
Terms of trade -0.015 0.020 0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.002
(0.08) (0.09) (0.73) (0.33) (0.35) (0.47)
Aid -0.135 0.123 -0.004 -0.106 0.099 0.049
(3.51)∗∗∗ (3.44)∗∗∗ (0.22) (1.38) (1.24) (1.20)
IMF-supported program 0.609 -0.481 0.089 0.744 -0.267 -0.386
(1.39) (1.19) (0.40) (1.47) (0.60) (1.07)
Constant 21.168 12.234 9.182 5.878 7.082 4.099
(8.96)∗∗∗ (5.98)∗∗∗ (7.58)∗∗∗ (0.80) (0.84) (1.13)
R2 0.54 0.59 0.58
F-test 3.24 2.83 2.17
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Sargan test 17.12 16.80 16.33
(0.250) (0.267) (0.293)
2nd order test 1.24 0.11 -0.14
(0.216) (0.909) (0.889)
No. of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42
No. of obs. 878 878 711 878 878 711
Robust standard errors reported in brackets.∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 10%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
The instruments used in the GMM regressions are lagged levels (two periods and more) of the dependent
variable and GDP per capita for the differenced equation, and lagged difference (one period) for the level
equation.
F-test is a F test of the null hypothesis that all country-specific effects in the FE-specification are equal.
Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null of
instrument validity.
2nd order test is a test for second-order serail correlation in the first-difference residuals, asymptotically
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.
P-values for rejecting the null hypothesis are reported in brackets.
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Table 5: Wages and Subsidies
FE estimates GMM
Dependent Wages Subsidies All targeted Wages Subsidies All targeted
variables expenditure expenditure
Elections 0.243 0.503 0.035 0.267 0.603 0.273
(1.80)∗ (1.75)∗ (0.08) (1.82)∗ (1.87)∗ (0.73)
R2 0.59 0.62 0.64
F-test 2.57 2.67 1.92
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007)
Sargan test 8.00 12.86 8.55
(0.889) (0.538) (0.859)
2nd order test 0.72 0.54 -1.33
(0.474) (0.592) (0.185)
No. of countries 41 41 41 41 41 41
No. of obs. 741 794 739 741 794 739
Robust standard errors reported in brackets. ∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 10%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
The covariates are similar to those in Table 3.
Table 6: Predetermined Versus Endogenous Election Dates
FE estimates GMM
Dependent Current Capital Infrastructure Current Capital Infrastructure
variables expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
Predetermined elections 1.562 -1.422 -0.261 1.788 -1.449 -0.367
(3.15)∗∗∗ (3.09)∗∗∗ (1.00) (2.71)∗∗∗ (2.34)∗∗∗ (1.26)
Potentially endogenous elections 0.164 -0.334 0.046 0.347 -0.639 0.161
(0.22) (0.48) (0.12) (0.49) (0.85) (0.35)
R2 0.54 0.59 0.58
F-test 3.23 2.81 2.16
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Sargan test 17.47 16.76 16.27
(0.232) (0.269) (0.297)
2nd order test 1.11 -0.03 -0.15
(0.265) (0.975) (0.884)
No. of countries 42 42 42 42 42 42
No. of obs. 878 878 711 878 878 711
Robust standard errors reported in brackets. ∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 10%, ∗∗∗significant at 1%.
The covariates are similar to those in Table 3.
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Table 7: Competitive Elections
FE estimates GMM
Dependent Current Capital Infrastructure Current Capital Infrastructure
variables expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
Competitive elections 1.238 -1.135 -0.046 1.294 -0.968 -0.430
(2.69)∗∗∗ (2.67)∗∗∗ (0.20) (2.49)∗∗ (2.30)∗∗ (0.16)
R2 0.54 0.58 0.53
F-test 2.55 2.31 2.45
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sargan test 21.70 18.26 13.23
(0.185) (0.195) (0.509)
2nd order test 1.05 0.09 -0.31
(0.296) (0.932) (0.759)
No. of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
No. of obs. 687 687 534 687 687 534
Robust standard errors reported in brackets. ∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 10%, ∗∗∗significant
at 1%.
The covariates are similar to those in Table 3.
Table 8: The Evolution of the Political Budget Cycles Over Time
FE estimates GMM
Dependent Current Capital Infrastructure Current Capital Infrastructure
variables expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure expenditure
1rstelection 1.944 -1.709 0.453 1.536 -1.283 0.409
(1.95)∗ (1.85)∗ (0.86) (1.76)∗ (1.78)∗ (0.49)
2ndelection 2.170 -1.415 0.177 2.467 -1.719 0.090
(2.57)∗∗ (1.81)∗ (0.42) (2.45)∗∗ (1.99)∗ (0.17)
3rdelection 0.391 -0.285 -0.305 0.652 -0.245 -0.436
(1.40) (1.32) (0.56) (1.30) (1.20) (0.97)
4thelection 0.420 -0.520 -0.792 0.520 -0.367 -0.531
(1.76)∗ (1.78)∗ (1.41) (1.56) (1.62) (1.12)
5thelection 3.569 -3.409 -0.897 3.095 -3.061 -0.942
(2.43)∗∗ (2.50)∗∗ (1.28) (1.95)∗ (1.87)∗ (3.52)∗∗∗
R2 0.54 0.58 0.53
F-test 2.66 2.40 2.41
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Sargan test 20.47 17.19 11.71
(0.216) (0.246) (0.629)
2nd order test 1.16 0.90 -0.28
(0.247) (0.920) (0.777)
No. of countries 40 40 40 40 40 40
No. of obs. 687 687 534 687 687 534
Robust standard errors reported in brackets. ∗significant at 5%, ∗∗significant at 10%, ∗∗∗significant
at 1%.
The covariates are similar to those in Table 3.
Dummy variables take the value of 1 in the first, second, third, fourth and later elections,
respectively, and 0 otherwise.
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